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ABSTRACT
Smartphone and tablets are personal devices that have diffused to near universal ubiquity in
recent years. As Smartphone users become more privacy-aware and -conscious, research is needed
to understand how “leakage” of private information (personally identifiable information – PII)
occurs. This study explores how leakage studies in Droid devices should be adapted to Apple iOS
devices. The OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) is examined for 50 apps in various categories.
This study confirms that: (1) most apps transmit unencrypted sensitive PII, (2) SSL is used by
some recipient websites, but without corresponding app compliance with SSL, and (3) most apps
in iOS environments reveal (leak) smartphone version. The paper concludes that much additional
work is needed to assess the privacy dominance between platforms and to raise user awareness of
smartphone privacy intrusions.
Keywords: mobile forensics, ZAP, privacy leakage, metadata, security

INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, there are a large number of
applications, hereafter called “apps,” available
© 2016 ADFSL

for smartphone platforms such as iOS and
Android. According to the statistics released
by Statista (2015), there are 1.5 million
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Android apps and 1.4 million iOS apps that
have been downloaded 9.19 billion times in
2013 only. Statista (2015) have predicted that
this number will rise to 260 billion by 2017.
Also, one out of nine apps are free - a strategy
aiming to create a financial revenue for the
developers, relying on advertisement which is
built into the development API, such as iAds
for iOS and Ads for Android.
In order to make these advertisements
more successful, they need to target the right
audience. Therefore, one can expect that app
developers and platform providers have a
strong incentive of gaining additional
information about their users. According to
Campbell (2013), there are also other state
actors such as the National Security Agency of
the United States (NSA) interested in
gathering metadata. Although this was
suspected previously, the Snowden Revelations
have provided proof on how far these actors
are willing to go in order to obtain private
data. These actors rely on capturing
unencrypted network traffic, metadata, and
private information broadcasted by third
parties, such as smartphone apps.
The research in this paper is concerned
with private data leaked by smartphone apps.
The user groups benefiting from this research
are average smartphone consumers, privacy
lobbyist, app developers, policy makers, and
regulators. The paper also identifies good and
bad practices of app developers. The objectives
of this research include i) selecting a number of
apps to be investigated; ii) identifying what
kind of data is of interest to the actors
involved, and iii) identifying what data is
leaked.
This paper is structured as follows: Section
2 presents a literature survey identifying and
discussing the privacy concerns existent within
the smartphone apps environment. Digital
forensics areas are also discussed, as well as
techniques and tools used for this research.
Page 168

Section 3 discusses the methodology, while
Section 4 presents the apps and the
experiments carried out. Section 5 illustrates
the analysis of the results, while Section 6
concludes the paper.

LITERATURE REVIEW
According to the European Convention on
Human Rights, “privacy is a basic human
right” (Woogara, 2001); however, it has been
reported that the Facebook app breached
users’ privacy (Steel and Fowler, 2010).
Therefore, the question “is privacy still possible
in the twenty-first century?” was posed
(Berman and Bruening, 2001). Such questions
arise due to the emergence of new technologies
and services that expose users’ private
information, while users share this data
without fully understanding the implications.
One of the dominant factors in the
development and acceptance of these
technologies are smartphones. With the recent
proliferation of smartphones, their available
capabilities, usage and services, as well as their
forecasted growth, researchers are studying
their impact on people’s lives due to the
amount of data that they withheld from their
users (Vautin and Walker, 2011).
Nowadays,
smartphones
withhold
information such as SMS, location information,
emails, banking details, user habits, time and
duration of user activity, and much more.
Michalevsky et al. (2015) have shown how easy
it is to track the location of an Android user
by using an app to send out the battery power
consumption
information.
Furthermore,
Stewart et al. (2012) have shown that due the
presence of certain peripherals on smartphones,
it is possible to automatically identify users’
physical activities throughout the day.
Although their research was mainly targeting
sports activities, it is reasonable to expect that
this result is applied to other activities such as
sleep and eating patterns.
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Apps Privacy Leakages
As highlighted at the start of this section,
privacy is a basic human right to which
everyone is entitled. However, ubiquitous
computing has brought challenges in a number
of fields and privacy is amongst them. On one
hand, users prefer free services, but on the
other hand, these services are developed with
profit in mind (Gandhi et al., 2009). As for
apps, users are more likely to download free
products rather than paid (Khalid et al., 2014).
Some of these apps end up disclosing ample
information about the user to the app
provider. Companies collect this data and then
sell it to other companies for business model
purposes; therefore, the private data leaked by
these apps has become the indispensable
currency that users pay for free apps (Khalid
et al., 2014).
The research in this paper is mainly
concerned with the security of iOS apps. There
is substantial research carried out on Android
apps due to their popularity and the fact that
they are released for public download after less
rigorous testing than iOS apps (Lu et al.,
2012). Therefore, this paper explores the dire
need for researching the privacy concerns and
security implementation for enhancing privacy
protection in iOS apps.

Digital Forensics
Digital forensics is a science field focusing on
recovery and investigation to obtain digital
evidence (Bommisetty et al., 2014). Moreover,
once the evidence is found, it has to be
preserved, identified, documented, and then
analysed or interpreted. Digital forensics is
divided into five main areas which are:
Computer Forensics, Memory Forensics,
Network Forensics, Multimedia Forensics, and
Mobile Device Forensics (Casey, 2011b). The
research in this paper is mainly concerned with
mobile forensics and network forensics. The
main reason for selecting the iOS platform is
© 2016 ADFSL

CDFSL Proceedings 2016

the noticeable gap in the literature with
regards to iOS app testing. Pilli et al. (2010)
highlights a number of useful tools, procedures
and frameworks for monitoring and capturing
data coming from a device on a specific
network. Though Wireshark is considered to be
the second most popular security tool by
administrators (Orebaugh et al., 2006), it is
also hailed to be the best network protocol
analyser by some researchers (Banerjee et al.,
2010). However, according to Pomaska (2009),
Wireshark is somewhat complicated to use,
and more difficult to demonstrate to others,
especially to juries. However, Munoz and
Villalba (2013) suggest that web application
proxies are very effective in carrying out tasks
similar to the ones required for this research,
such as the free and open source tool ZAP.

Tools and Detecting Methods
Numerous methods are used to detect
smartphone private information leakage, such
as:
1. Framework tools: The developers built
these tools according to two methods:
static and dynamic security.
a. Static analysis is an analysis
method for mobile application
in non-runtime environments.
Egele et al. (2011) presented
PIOS using this analysis to
detect leakage. During the
experimentations,
the
researchers tested more than
1400 iPhone apps and they
found that more than half of
them had leaked the unique ID
of the mobile devices. Therefore,
this data leakage allows third
parties to create users’ profile
without their knowledge. It is
worth noting that in this
experiment, some apps were
tested that were on jailbreak
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iPhone firmware and did not
have any privacy leakage (Egele
et al., 2011). Also there are
many
other
frameworks
developed based on the static
method, shown in Table 1.
b. Dynamic analysis is the real
time analysis method consisting
in
testing
and
analysing
software or mobile apps to
detect the vulnerabilities. Chan
et al. (2013) identified the
privacy leakage of 226 Android
apps. The results have been
divided into three categories,
and the report shows that
46.5% of apps leaked private
data. Chan et al. (2013) have
used TaintDroid, a real-time
monitoring tool. However, they
used manual testing to identify
what kinds of private data had

been leaked as TaintDroid did
not provide this information.
Table 2 shows the list of
dynamic analysis frameworks
used to detect privacy leakages.
2. Network sniffing tools: For real-time
network sniffing tools, Taylor et al.
(2014) used Wireshark and Mallory to
test apps for information leakage.
Thirty-five applications were tested in
three rounds. For the first round,
Wireshark was used for a passive
analysis. For the second round, Mallory
was used to analyse network traffic. An
encrypted CA certificate installed on a
reliable test device so that Android OS
would not refuse Certificates provided
by Mallory. The CA certificate was
removed in the third round and a
typical MITM (Man in the Middle)
attack was simulated.

Table 1
List of frameworks based on static analysis conducted on the Android platform

Frameworks

Platform

Year

IccTA

Android

AppIntent

Android

2014
(Li et al.,
2014)
2013
(Yang et al.,
2013)

Leakminer

Android

Page 170

2012
(Yang and
Yang, 2012)

Apps
Tested
3000
1000

1750

Main findings
425 of this apps leaked
information related to the
phone device ID and location
Sensitive data leakage in 252
apps, out of which 224 contain
user unintended and 28 contain
user intended data
transmission
127 apps leaked the device ID,
27 leaked location, 50 leaked
phone related information and
12 leaked contacts
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Table 2
List of frameworks based on dynamic analysis conducted on the Android platform

Frameworks

Platform

Year

Play Ground

Android

2013
(Rastogi et
al., 2013)

DroidTest

Android

2013
(Rumee and
Liu, 2013)

50

TISSA

Android

2011
(Zhou et al.,
2011)

24

METHODOLODY AND
IMPLEMENTATION
The top 5 apps from 10 different categories
were downloaded and installed from the iTunes
App Store. This will ensure that only the most
popular apps, which are likely to be perceived
by users as well-designed, are tested and
evaluated. This will also ensure that the
experiment is unbiased - no faulty or poorly
designed apps are selected to influence the
outcome of the research. Afterwards, through
network monitoring techniques and tools
identified in the literature and used in the
world of digital forensics, the smartphone
traffic was monitored, identifying the
consideration given to privacy in the
development of these apps.
The experiment was carried out using the
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP). ZAP can
be used to perform scans with the intention
either to reveal vulnerabilities and security
flaws, or to inform whether the application
reveals any kind of information about the user
or the device that is being used. As the aim of
this project is to investigate privacy,
preserving considerations within smartphone
applications, only passive scans are of interest.
Passive scans are performed each time a
© 2016 ADFSL

Apps
Tested
3968

Main findings
Privacy leakage in 946 apps,
844 apps leaked phone related
information, while 212 apps
location related information
36 apps leaked more than one
piece of sensitive information,
such as ID, mobile number,
model number.
14 apps leaked location related
information, 13 apps leaked
IMEI and 6 apps leaked both
location and IMEI information.

HTTP message response is received. In
contrast to active scans, which are issued to
perform known attacks and therefore modify
messages before sending them to the server
again in order to search for a specific
vulnerability in the response, passive scans do
not alter the messages.
ZAP supports the use of SSL connections
and gives users the opportunity to generate
SSL certificates in order to test SSL enabled
communications; however, for the subsequent
implementation this feature has not been
configured, as properly implemented SSL
connections will not leak any private data, and
exploiting against SSL is beyond the scope of
this project. ZAP is an intercepting proxy that
can be used to intercept any traffic that passes
through ZAP. In order to intercept the
communication between the device and the
applications of interest, HTTP Proxy settings,
namely the ZAP hosting computer IP address
and port, had to be configured accordingly, as
shown in Figure 1.

Page 171

CDFSL Proceedings 2016

Forensic Analysis of Smartphone Applications for …
Table 3
List of categories and number of apps downloaded from
each category

Figure 1. Setting HTTP Proxy setting on iOS 8

For experimental purposes, the five top free
applications within their respective categories
were downloaded from App Store and accessed
from iTunes, with the exception of the games
and sports categories, where four and six
applications were downloaded respectively as
shown in Table 3. For demonstration purposes,
interception attempts will be presented for five
applications that are described in detail in
Section 5. The remaining applications and
relative results will be summarized as well.

Category

Number of Apps
downloaded

Education

5

Games

4

Health and
Fitness

5

Lifestyle

5

Navigation

5

News

5

Weather

5

Travel

5

Utilities

5

Sport

6

RESULTS
This section presents the results derived from
the experiment described in Section 4, which
aims
to
investigate
whether
privacy
preservation is taken into consideration in the
development of mobile applications. Hereafter
it is intended to demonstrate what kind of
information is leaked from each application
and under what circumstances. Although
detailed results are presented for five
applications, findings for all 50 applications
that have been tested are summarized at the
end of the section.

AA Theory Test
This is an app that helps users prepare for the
theory part of the Driving Test in the UK. It
comes in two different versions, a paid version
and a free version. The paid version currently
costs £2.29 and the free version is a restricted
version of the app. The app is developed by
ABEL learning limited, and is available for
other smartphone platforms as well. ABEL
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apps, available on the app store for download.
The app was downloaded and tested on the
mobile device. Prior to allowing access to app
features and content, user registration is
required. For testing purposes, the information
entered in the registration form was random.
Internet
connection
was
successfully
established via ZAP, as shown in Figure 2.
Information such as the name, gender, email
address, and postcode of the user, as well as
the phone model and operating system is
revealed, as shown in Figure 2. Other optional
fields in the app registration form include date
of birth, house number, and mobile phone
number; however, this information is not
shown, as it has not been provided by the user.
The main issue with the specific application is
that encryption has not been employed and
therefore any information exchanged between
the two communicating parties would be
displayed in plain text, including personal data
that the user provides during the registration,
as well as information related to the device
that is being used. It is interesting to note the
fact that, at the time of the investigation, the
specific application was the most popular one
among similar educational apps.

Duolingo

CDFSL Proceedings 2016

Duolingo is a free language learning application
offering courses across 23 languages and is
available n several platforms. According to the
App Store’s description, it was chosen as
Apple’s “App of the year” in 2013. In total,
there are four apps available for download on
App store. Although there was an error
creating the user account, and therefore the
app was not functioning, data attempting to
leave the network was successfully intercepted
by ZAP, as shown in Figure 3. Data such as
the phone operating system and its version,
Internet Service Provider (ISP) name, type of
network, user interface language, phone
manufacturer, local network IP address, and
local time have been revealed. Sending out
information that is not actually required by
the app further confirms what was discussed
earlier in the literature review; often free apps
have a privacy cost. There is no apparent
reason for the app to know most of the
information sent out such as the ISP name,
local IP address, whether the user is connected
to a Wi-Fi or 3G network, other than
gathering data and selling it off to a third
party. Furthermore, data is not encrypted;
thus, by monitoring network traffic, one could
gain access to private information, which in
this case is displayed in plain text as shown in
Figure 3.

Figure 2. ZAP screenshot of AA Theory Test Traffic

© 2016 ADFSL
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Figure 3. ZAP screenshot of Duolingo

Figure 4. ZAP screenshot of Google

Figure 5. ZAP screenshot of Chrome
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Figure 5. ZAP screenshot of Fancy key for iOS

Google
Google is a free search engine and is used to
search for information on the web. It is
developed by Google (Google, 2015b) and is
one of the most successful applications on the
market. After downloading the app, Siri was
used to search for Starbucks coffee shops in
Coventry and a connection to the internet via
ZAP was successfully established, as shown in
in Figure 4. The search term “Starbucks in
Coventry” that was used is shown, along with
the device information, including the model,
version A including the model, version and
operating system.

Chrome
Chrome is a free browser application for
retrieving and presenting information from the
web, which also supports voice search and is
developed by Google. The app was downloaded
and tested on the mobile device. Although
there was a connection error due to the invalid
certificate authority, data attempting to leave
the network was successfully intercepted. For
testing purposes, the “London” keyword was
entered in the search bar and data was
intercepted by ZAP attempting to leave the
network as shown in Figure 5. Information
about the phone model, version, operating

© 2016 ADFSL

system, architecture and user ID has been
revealed.
Surprisingly, when using Siri in Google
search, HTTP protocol is used to return the
results, allowing ZAP to capture the search
term. However, when searching with Chrome,
the HTTPS protocol is used. This is an
indication that Siri does not rely on HTTPS,
making the users vulnerable to having their
search term monitored and revealed, as it is
transmitted in plain text.

Fancy key for iOS 8
Fancy key is a free keyboard app with several
customizable themes and fonts to choose from,
allowing users to personalize their keyboards.
The app is developed by PinssibleLabs.
The app was downloaded and opened on
the testing device. The sent information was
captured by ZAP, as depicted in Figure 6. The
app ‘Fancy key for iOS 8’ did not seem to rely
on any encryption on first instance opening the
file. Although the connection between the
device and the app passes through the proxy
server, there were no functional problems or
error messages, as it would be expected for
apps that rely on SSL. This is an indication
that the browser is sending information in
order to predict the OS of the phone. However,
although such information might be needed for
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mobile app offloading in order to reduce
resource consumption, even in that case, user
privacy is not taken into consideration.
Table 4 summarizes the results gathered
during the testing of all 50 apps. The
abbreviation VER (Version) is used to denote
the hardware version number or software
version number. LOCATION refers to the
location of the mobile device, as well as to
locations that have been searched. ID refers to

the iPhone ID, email, user name and password,
Wi-Fi and IP address. GENINFO (General
Information) is used for data that has been
used as a search term and it was shown in
ZAP. GENINFO* refers to data that differs
from the general information searched on the
search bar which is shown in ZAP. Also,
hyphen symbolizes no leakage, while asterisk
(*) symbolizes that it could not be determined
whether the data transmitted has been
encrypted or not.

Health and Fitness

Games

Education

Table 4
Privacy leakage of 50 apps conducted on the iOS platform

Name of Apps

Encrypted

Using SSL

Leakage

AA Theory Test

NO

NO

VER, LOCATION, ID

Duolingo

NO

NO

VER, LOCATION, ID

Theory test free for Car Drivers

*

YES

-

Theory test UK 2015

*

YES

-

iTunes U

*

YES

-

Candy crash soga

NO

YES

VER

Jenga

YES

NO

VER, ID

SongPop

NO

NO

VER, LOCATION, ID

Arrow

NO

YES

-

Pacer

NO

NO

VER, GENINFO, ID

7 Minute workout

NO

NO

VER, GENINFO, LOCATION, ID

Sworkit lite

NO

NO

VER

Nike+ Running

YES

YES

-

Period Diary

NO

NO

VER, GENINFO, LOCATION, ID
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Weather

News

Navigation
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Name of Apps

Encrypted

Using SSL

Leakage

eBay

NO

NO

GENINFO

Boots

NO

NO

GENINFO, VER

New Look Fashion

NO

NO

VER, GENINFO, LOCATION,

Amazon

*

YES

-

Gumtree

*

YES

-

GPS Navigation, Maps & Traffic Scout (Sat
Nav)

NO

NO

VER, LOCATION

London Bus Live Countdown

NO

NO

VER, LOCATION

Just Park

NO

NO

VER, LOCATION

Waze

YES

YES

-

Shell Motorist

YES

YES

-

MailOnline

NO

NO

GENINFO

The Guardian

NO

NO

GENINFO, VER

NO

NO

BuzzFeed

NO

NO

GENINFO, VER

Sky News

NO

NO

GENINFO, VER

The Weather Channel and weather.co.uk

NO

NO

GENINFO, LOCATION

Weather Live

NO

NO

GENINFO, LOCATION

10D Weather

NO

NO

GENINFO, LOCATION

UK Weather forecast

NO

NO

GENINFO, LOCATION

AccuWeather

NO

NO

GENINFO, LOCATION

The train line

NO

NO

GENINFO

Rayinair

NO

NO

GENINFO

TripAdvisor

YES

YES

VER

Booking.com

NO

YES

LOCATION

British Airways Google

NO

NO

GENINFO

AOL: Mail, News, Weather & Videos
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Name of Apps

Encrypted

Using SSL

Leakage

Chrome

NO

YES

VER

Snap Upload for Snapchat

NO

NO

GENINFO*

Fancy key for iOS 8

NO

NO

VER, GENINFO

Find IPhone

YES

YES

Encrypted

Kick 15

NO

YES

GENINFO*

UFC®

*

YES

-

Golfshot

*

YES

-

Dream Team

*

YES

-

Mirror Fantasy iTeam

NO

YES

VER

Soccer Saturday super 6

Wider Implications of Privacy
Leakage
The implications of privacy leakage in
smartphones are becoming an area of study all
of its own. First and foremost, the
development of the smartphone phenomena
from the development of the iPhone has been
one of extraordinary growth and adoption by
the world wide user community. During 2016
smartphone per capita penetration is estimated
at 31.3%, demonstrating the depth of its usage.
The particular element that renders the
smartphone a privacy fault-line is the extent to
which these devices have access to personalized
data. The parallel development of social
networking and the “Facebook” phenomena
means that users “willingly” allow access to
their personalized data in a virtual context
that in the tangible world would be hard to
imagine. However, it is the capability to
collect, store, and potentially disseminate
disparate personalized data that makes the
issue critical in smartphone usage. Not only do
these devices enable audio (and increasingly
face to face) telephone, messaging, texting, and
twitter use, but they have the potential to
Page 178
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record 24/7 the location, actions, habits and
activities of individuals. When this is linked to
the available and emerging “wearable”
technologies as exampled by the Apple watch
and its Android rivals, the capability of sensor
data to collect personal health information
adds an additional layer of data that these
technologies facilitate - the extent to which
this, if breached, enables remote surveillance
and observation to an Orwellian level of
paranoia.
The mitigations available to prevent such
data leakage, for example “new privacy mode,”
offer some reassurance that users have not
been left at the mercy of exploitation by
manufacturers
and software
developers.
However, the customization offered is to a
large extent dependent upon the sophistication
and technical adroitness of the user and this is
set against a landscape where making software
accessible arguably is at the cost of the levels
of security required. The use of encryption, a
feature of the latest iterations of iOS and
Android, illustrates the extent to which
privacy concerns have been heeded. There is,
however, and particularly in the context of the
© 2016 ADFSL
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Android user, base that still makes use of
legacy versions of the operating system.

applications
encryption.

All in all, the risks of personalized data
being compromised are a “clear and present”
danger and one for which, arguably, a
proportion of users are inadequately informed
and prepared to deal with. In a legal context,
End User License Agreement (EULA) is too
often ignored by users, allowing the pharming
of data for marketing purposes. Users are
either blasé, ignorant, or confused by EULAs,
finding them overly long and designed to
obfuscate rather than illuminate user
understanding. As the European vision of clear
assent to the “passing onward” of personally
identifiable information (PII) comes to the
U.S., these apps will require revision and
transparent user control over the “leakage”
features discussed in this paper. The “clear
assent” requirement is likely to force changes
which transform EULAs into being positively
protective in respect of preventing data
leakage, transferring responsibility from the
user to the app developer.

The ideas presented in this paper can be
further extended in several ways. One direction
of future work is to test and evaluate the
smartphone applications on different platforms,
such as Windows mobile and Android.

CONCLUSIONS AND
FUTURE WORK
The main goal of this study was to assess the
level of private information leaked within
smartphone applications. For experimental
purposes, 50 applications have been tested for
information leakage, using the ZAP proxy to
intercept traffic. Over the preceding sections it
was found that mobile applications transmit
personal user data, including smartphone,
resources,
ISP,
and
location
related
information. The majority of the applications
have leaked the version of the mobile device
and, in most of the cases that have been
examined, there was no encryption employed.
Only a few applications that use SSL have not
leaked any information, while the rest have
either not configured SSL properly, or the

© 2016 ADFSL

themselves

are

not

using

Analyzing smartphone applications for
privacy leakage and comparing similar issues
across different platforms would allow for a
global view of the problem. In addition,
although the analysis of data sent out by
applications that use SSL certificates is beyond
the scope of this paper, it would be interesting
to investigate whether such applications are
properly
configured
to
handle
SSL
communications. The results presented in this
paper show that privacy can be preserved
when SSL is properly configured. However, this
might increase the power consumption, and
thus reduce the battery life and charge cycle of
the device. It is therefore important to
investigate the trade-off between privacy
preserving and power consumption.
Finally, with a view to increase users’
privacy awareness about information leakage
and any associated risks, another possibility of
future work would be to carry out research
into ways of maximizing users’ awareness of
the possibility of information leakage and its
implications.
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